The political process in the United States appears to be highly polarized: evidence from voting patterns finds that the political positions of legislators have diverged substantially, while the largest campaign contributions come from the most extreme lobby groups and are directed to the most extreme candidates. Is the rise in campaign contributions the cause of growing polarity of political views? In this paper, we show that, in standard models of lobbying and electoral competition, free-rider problems amongst potential contributors leads naturally to a divergence in campaign contributors without any divergence in candidates' policy positions. However, we go on to show that a modest departure from standard assumptions -allowing candidates to directly value campaign contributions (because of "ego rents" or because lax auditing allows them to misappropriate some of these funds) -delivers the ability of campaign contributions to cause policy divergence.
Introduction
The political process in the United States appears to be highly polarized. This observation has two dimensions. First, evidence from voting patterns finds that the political positions of legislators have diverged substantially. Second, the largest campaign contributions tend to come from the most extreme lobby groups and are typically directed to the most extreme candidates. Moreover, these trends appear related, with increases in campaign spending coinciding with the increase in the polarization of US politicians. This begs the question of whether or not the dominance of extreme lobby groups is the cause of the rising polarization in US politics? and, if not, what are the forces that lead to the dominance of extreme lobby groups and of the rising political polarization?
Towards an answer to these questions, we present a theoretical model of policy formation, lobbying and electoral success. In the model, the polarization of campaign contributions arises out of a natural incentive for moderate interest groups to free ride on the campaign contributions of more extreme interest groups. Unsurprisingly, candidates with more extreme positions receive larger contributions. However, we show that, under standard assumptions on the objectives of politicians, the polarization of campaign contributions is associated with the convergence of politicians' policies. We then show that by departing from standard assumptions and allowing politicians to care about the absolute level of campaign contributions, in addition to their probability of winning the election which is influenced by the relative level of such contributions, we can generate policy divergence in equilibrium with complete polarization obtaining in some special cases. We finally explore the models predictions for the effect of various campaign finance reforms, as well as for the level of polarization of politicians across countries with differing political systems.
These results all derive from the operation of the same force that leads to the extremity of campaign contributions in the first place. The intuition for this is quite straightforward. As more extreme lobby groups care more intensely about policies than do moderate interest groups, they have an greater incentive to make larger contributions. Moreover, their incentive to contribute (and the amount contributed) is increasing in the degree of polarization of policy platforms. Thus, moving towards an extreme position increases the size of a candidate's campaign chest. However, such move affects the opponent's contributions as well. And, under standard assumptions, the increase in the opponent's contributions is in fact greater than that in the candidate's own campaign chest. Thus, if politicians only care about their probability of being elected, and if this probability depends on relative campaign expenditures, the result is policy convergence. However, once politicians begin to care about the absolute size of their contributions -whether because of "ego rents" or intrinsic greed and corruption -the incentive to make policy diverge so as to maximize the absolute level of contributions is restored. This paper is motivated by a substantial empirical literature examining polariza-tion in politics, and the role of lobby groups and campaign contributions. Evidence for the increased polarization of legislator positions over the past three decades has been assembled from legislator voting patterns by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997, 2006) . Our focus on lobbyists support of candidates with a commitment to a fixed collective agenda, and on the polarization of campaign contributions, is likewise motivated by several empirical findings. Most notably consistent with this framework, Langbein (1993) and Poole and Romer (1985) have found that contributors rarely donate to candidates on both sides of an issue.
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Similarly, many authors have found that contributors support candidates with similar ideological views 2 , with this result being strongest for groups with strong ideological positions (e.g. Langbein (1993) ). Similarly, in a series of papers Snyder (1990) , Snyder (1992) , Snyder (1993) has argued that ideological Political Action Committees (PACs) do not fit a quid pro quo model of contributions, while Welch (1979) cites evidence that ideological PACs focus on close races as evidence in favor of models of contributions in support of a candidate with given position. Finally, Poole and Romer (1985) provide evidence that contributors provide the largest quantity of support for like-minded candidates. Our emphasis on free riding by interest groups is consistent with a substantial empirical literature that has found free riding by lobby groups to be important, albeit typically in the context of specific policies. For example, Bloch (1993) finds that the degree of unionization is positively related to support for minimum wage legislation, while Kischgassner and Pommerehne (1988) find that it is positively related to measures of social expenditure. Other authors have found a positive relationship between producer concentration in an industry and political influence 3 .
On the theoretical side, in an important early contribution, Austen-Smith (1987) considered competition between two rival lobbying groups and established a convergence result for candidate agendas. In this paper, we generalize the convergence result to a situation in which the identity and number of contributors is endogenous, and where free riding leads to divergence of lobby groups. We also establish the limits of this result once candidates are allowed to value the absolute level of their contributions. The intuitive idea that lobbyists and campaign contributions may lead to polarization is present in Baron (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) amongst others. Unlike Baron (1994) , we focus on the public good character of campaign contributions, and show that polarization may result for collective policies, in addition to particularistic policies. In contrast to the intuition laid out in Persson and Tabellini (2000) , we show that polarization of lobbyists may nonetheless lead to policy convergence when candidates care only about electoral success. Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008) explain polarization in a model that differs from ours in that it abstracts from the role of lobbyists in campaign financing. Our divergence result is distinct from other explanations that rely on divergent candidate preferences (Roemer (1991) or Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) ), uncertainty about candidate type (Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) ), or the threat of third candidate entry (Palfrey (1984) ; see also, the survey by Osborne (1995) ). Finally, note that Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008, 2009 ) study campaign spending with fixed agenda's, while Jackson, Mathevet, and Mattes (2007) establish the possibility of agenda divergence in a model where candidates spend their own resources in the absence of lobbyists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents our results on the divergence of contributions with convergent policies. Section 4 introduces greedy politicians into the basic model and derives the polarization results. Section 5 investigates some implications of the model, and Section 6 concludes.
The General Model
In this section, we outline a relatively general model of agenda setting, campaign contributions, and electoral outcomes. In succeeding sections, we specialize this model in various ways in order to focus on specific forces that affect the decision making of both candidates and contributors.
Consider a model with the following elements. There are two political candidates competing for election to one position, indexed by i = 1, 2. The game begins with each candidate selecting a policy platform or "agenda", denoted a i ∈ [0, 1]. That is, we are allowing candidates to commit to an agenda.
There exists a finite (and possibly large) number of lobby groups. Each lobby group is identified with (and indexed by) its preferred agenda j ∈ [0, 1]. A lobby group's preferences over agendas, a, are represented by
with a common α > 0. It is typical to assume that α ≥ 1, which ensures that V is concave so that the marginal distaste of a lobby group for an agenda is increasing as the agenda deviates further from the lobby's preferred agenda. We also allow for the case of α ∈ (0, 1) in which the marginal distaste for alternative agendas is initially high and decreases as agendas become further removed from the lobby's ideal point.
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In the second stage of the game, after observing the agenda choices of each candidate, each lobby group j may elect to contribute a non-negative amount c j (i) towards candidate i's campaign at a cost to the lobby group given by
For now, we assume only that φ is convex and increasing in total contributions.
In the third stage of the game, each candidate i chooses how much to spend on their electoral campaign. This choice, S i , is constrained in by both the size of contributions, and by the institutions governing the use of campiagn funds. For example, in a country with relatively little corruption and accurate auditing of campaign donations, candidates may have to spend all of their campaign contributions; in a country with a great deal of corruption and little auditing, candidates may be able to appropriate some or all of their campaign contributions for their own personal consumption. For now, we represent these constraints abstractly by choice set B:
(2.
3)
The preferences of each candidate are likewise expressed somewhat abstractly as the sum of a term that captures the private benefit of campaign contributions net of campaign spending, and a term that reflects the expected benefit from winning the election:
where W represents the value the agent places on winning the election, p is the probability of winning the election, and where the notation "−i" (for "not i") has been used to denote the rival candidate. For simplicity, we assume that the candidate has no preference over agendas, except in so far as they affect the size of campaign contributions and the probability of electoral victory. We assume that the candidates utility function is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave with lim
The probability of winning the election has been conditioned on both the campaign spending of each candidate and their initial agenda choices, in order to encompass a wide array of voting mechanisms. For now we simply summarize the outcome of the fourth stage of the game -in which agents vote -simply in terms of the probability that a candidate wins the election as a function of both campaign spending and agenda choices, p(S i , S −i , a i , a −i ). This reduced form specification allows us to capture a number of alternative, and not necessarily exclusive, possible assumptions about the way campaign expenditures and agendas affect election outcomes. For example, in Appendix B we show that this framework captures both the informed and uninformed voter model of Baron (1994) and the "get out the vote" model of Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008) . In each of these examples, the probability of winning the election is continuously differentiable in the campaign spending levels S i (for strictly positive campaign levels) and in the choice of agenda a i , and is homogeneous of degree zero in campaign spending:
Hence, we maintain these assumptions below. We also restrict attention to symmetric p in the sense that if the spending and agenda's of the candidates are reversed, the probability of election is reversed as well, or
Finally, we assume that campaign spending increases the probability of winning the election, or
Divergent Lobbies and Convergent Agendas
To begin, and to focus attention on the "public good" aspect of campaign contributions, we specialize the above model in a number of ways. First, we assume that the candidates do not value campaign contributions except in so far as these contribution increase the probability of electoral success, and that campaign contributions are the only source of funds for campaign expenditures. The former is a relatively standard assumption in the literature although, as we will see below, it has a significant effect on the results.
Second, we assume that the probability of electoral success does not depend on agendas, and is strictly increasing in a candidates campaign spending. This has the effect of removing an obvious force for the convergence of agendas in equilibrium, and hence strengthens the nature of our convergence result. We relax this assumption below in Section 4.
Under our assumptions, the third stage of the game described above is degenerate. We solve the game consisting of the first two stages by backward induction.
Campaign Contributions
We first establish the identity of the contributing lobbies and the size of their contributions in an arbitrary subgame for given policy choices of the candidates, {a i }. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we will adopt the convention that candidate 1 is to the left of candidate 2, or a 1 a 2 .
Consider the problem of a lobby j, that is considering contributing to candidate 1. Then that lobby solves the following problem, taking as given the opponent's campaign fund C 2 = k c k (2) and the total contributions C 1 (−j) = k =j c k (1) of other lobbies to candidate 1's campaign:
which is equivalent to
where we have defined the added benefit to lobby j of policy a 1 over policy a 2 by
This is a very well behaved convex problem, with the first order condition for an optimum given by 4) and symmetrically for contributions to candidate 2
with each of these conditions holding with equality if the contribution by lobby j to candidate i = 1, 2 is positive.
Some results can be established without placing any further restrictions on the cost of funds or the preferences of the lobbies.
Lemma 1 No lobby ever makes positive contributions to both candidates.
Towards a contradiction, let c k (−j) > 0. Then we must also have
But both p and φ are strictly increasing, and
The properties of the solution depend on the curvature of the lobby's preferences (given by the size of α), the curvature of the probability of electoral success probability p, and the curvature of the cost of funds function φ. We get some of out starkest results when we assume that the cost of funds function φ is linear in contributions.
Constant Marginal Cost of Funds
Lemma 2 If α > 1 and φ(c) = φc, then only the extreme lobbies contribute in any subgame. That is, in every subgame, C 1 = c j and C 2 = c j , where j = min j is the left-most lobby and j = max j is the right-most lobby.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a j satisfying j < j < j such that the first order condition for contributing to one candidate holds with equality, or
But under the assumption of the lemma, for any a 1 < a 2 , ∆ j (a 1 , a 2 ) is decreasing in j. But then the first order condition for at least one of the extreme lobbies is violated, a contradiction. Suppose then that a 1 = a 2 . But then ∆ j (a 1 , a 2 ) = 0 for all j and no lobby contributes.
This result follows from the fact that less extreme lobbies have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of more extreme lobbies. In particular, the most extreme lobbyists contribute up to the point where the marginal benefit from an extra contribution equals its marginal cost. However, because all non-extreme lobbies have a strictly lower marginal benefit, and yet face the same marginal cost, they find it optimal not to contribute.
In order to ensure that the extreme lobbies make positive contributions, one could impose Inada condition on p and that a 1 = a 2 (or a weaker condition that ensures that the marginal product of the first contribution is greater than φ).
Lemma 3 If α < 1 and φ (c) = φc, then at most the lobbies most closely aligned with the candidates' platforms contribute in any subgame. More formally, in every subgame,
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of the previous lemma.
Note that the contributing lobby is either the lobby most closely aligned with the candidate (j i = arg min j |a i − j|) or, if the closest lobby is more centrist than the candidate, possibly the second closest.
Increasing Marginal Cost of Funds
The key to the extreme free riding results of the previous subsection is that the marginal cost of contributing the first dollar is strictly positive. If the marginal cost of contributing the first dollar is small, we obtain less extreme results in which more than one lobby may contribute to each candidate. For the purposes of generalization, let the preferences of a lobby j be now represented by
where σ > 1, and note that
In this case, the only lobby that may not contribute to any candidate is the one that is indifferent between the candidates. For all other lobbies, the first order condition with respect to contribution holds with equality for at least one candidate, or
Denoting the marginal productivity of contributions to candidate 1 by θ 1 = ∂p(C 1 , C 2 )/∂C 1 , and defining θ 2 analogously, we obtain (3.8) so that the most extreme candidates are still the largest contributors. To complete the characterization, we simply need to note that
Given our assumptions on p, it is relative contributions that matter for the probability of election. Noting that by homogeneity of degree zero,
, and hence using symmetry we obtain
, so that we can solve for relative contributions
which reduces to
when φ (c) = φc and α > 1. Proof. Due to concavity of the value function, moving away from the preferred point of a supporting coalition lowers the candidate's contribution more than the opponent's.
Political Agendas
This also establishes that, when α < 1, only one lobby contributes to each candidate.
We now establish the first key result -the convergence of agendas when the candidates' sole objective is winning the election. In particular, we show that, for all specifications, there is convergence in agendas to some "central" agenda. We also show that, in general, the convergence will not be to a median agenda, and provide conditions under which agendas converge to the one preferred by the average lobby group.
Theorem 1 If α > 1 and the candidates' sole objective is winning the election, the unique equilibrium has both candidates locating (choosing platforms) in the mid-point between the two extreme lobbies, at j
m = j+j 2
. Contributions are zero in equilibrium.
Proof. This is an equilibrium because moving away from the midpoint increases opponent's contributions more than your own. A candidate i, whose only objective is to win the election, will (strategically) maximize C i /C −i . That is, the candidate will take into account the effect of her choice of platform a i on the contributions to her opponent. So, the problem of the (left) candidate 1 is:
, then candidate i will choose to locate to the right of a −i (a i > a −i ). To see this, simply observe that ∆ j (a,
, then candidate i will choose to locate to the left of a −i (a i < a −i ). Either way, candidate i can guarantee herself more than 50% chance of winning the election. Thus, choosing any platform other than j m cannot be part of a pure strategy equilibrium. In fact, since choosing j m guarantees at least 50% chance of winning the election (regardless of what the opponent's platform is), the only equilibrium has both candidates choosing j m .
It is important to note that the above result is not a median voter result. The midpoint to which the platforms converge need not be the preferred point of a median voter (or a median lobby for that matter). , where ∆ is given by equation (3.3).
Theorem 2 If α < 1 and the candidates' sole objective is winning the election and the number of lobbies is
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 5.
Lastly, if α = 1, we have a continuum of equilibria with platforms locating anywhere on [j, j] and the identity (and number) of contributing lobbies being indeterminant in general. The multiplicity of equilibiria when α ≤ 1 is not robust to allowing the probability of an election victory to also depend directly on agendas. In particular, if there are any informed voters (who vote sincerely and are not affected by campaign spending), and there is a lobby that has the same preferred point as the median voter, then platforms converge to the median voter's preferred point.
With a more general convex cost of funds, we also get agenda convergence. To illustrate, consider the case of σ = 2 and α = 1. The former implies that
and the latter implies that the values ∆ simply compare the linear distance from the lobby to the two candidates. As a result, if the candidates' sole objective is to win the elections, the unique equilibrium is policy convergence to the "mean lobby" (the "probability" weighted average of all lobbies), as opposed to the midpoint agenda obtained under the constant marginal cost of funds.
4 Greedy Candidates and Divergent Agendas
In the previous section we have established a result that, at first glance, seems surprising: Even though the private provision of publicly valuable contributions leads to extreme lobbies being the largest (and in some cases, the only) contributors, and even though the contributions to a candidate are increasing with polarization, the agenda's of competing candidates converge in equilibrium. Upon reflection, the result is quite intuitive: although polarization increases the absolute level of a candidates contributions, they increase the level of the candidates opponent's contributions even more, so that relative contributions decline. Under our (standard) assumption that it is relative contributions that matter for electoral success, and that politicians care only about electoral success, we obtain policy convergence.
This logic also suggests that polarization should result in any model in which candidates value the absolute level of their contributions in addition to (or possibly instead of) their relative contributions. There are a large number of more or less compelling reasons why this might be the case. For example, candidates may derive some pure utility ("ego rents") from receiving a large quantity of contributions. Alternatively, if contributions to a campaign need not be spent on the campaign, and may instead be used to finance candidate consumption, then candidates will also value a large absolute level of contributions. Finally, to the extent that a candidate may use their own funds to support their campaign, the larger are the absolute level of contributions the less of a candidates own money will be spent on the campaign, leading candidates to value the absolute level of contributions.
In this section, we establish our agenda polarization result, first for the general case, and then in detail for a simple example.
General Case
In the previous section, we assumed that the probability of election depended only on campaign contributions in order to remove the most obvious force for convergence of policies, and hence to focus attention on our mechanism for convergence. Now that we seek to establish the divergence of policies, we allow the probability of winning the election to depend both on campaign spending and on the candidates' agendas, so that the incentive to choose divergent policies to maximize campaign contributions must offset the incentive to set agendas at the point preferred by the median voter. We maintain the assumptions on the probability of election that were introduced in Section 2.
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions (2.5), (2.6) and (2.8), the candidates' agendas diverge in equilibrium: a 1 = a 2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If there is no divergence in agendas, then campaign contributions are zero, and the candidate cannot divert anything for personal consumption. A small divergence in policies generated by one candidate produces positive campaign contributions that can be consumed and that, because of our assumption on candidate preferences, offset the reduction in the probability of winning the election.
Illustrative simple extension
Consider first an extremely simplified extension: Allow the candidates to consume fraction 1 − γ of the contributions they collect, and make their preferences increasing in consumption and independent of winning the election. Now, the candidates will choose their platforms with the sole goal of maximizing their own contributions. The candidates are no longer concerned with the opponent's contributions since they do not care about winning the elections. We immediately obtain the desired result:
Theorem 4 The unique equilibrium (for any α > 0) has two candidates tailoring to the extreme lobbies. That is, a 1 = j and a 2 = j.
It is worth noting that allowing the candidates to consume a fixed portion of endowments does not affect the (subgame) equilibrium contributions as a function of the platforms. That is, equation (3.11) still holds and does not include γ. The basic intuition for this (somewhat surprising) result comes from the fact that the marginal productivity of the contributions (in affecting the probability of election victory) remains unchanged. While left candidate's consumption lowers the productivity of the left lobby's contributions, the right candidate's consumption of her (right lobby's) contributions raises the productivity right back up. This observation will be important in allowing us to characterize the equilibria in a richer model of the next subsection (see the derivation (4.6)).
Richer Model
Again, the only aspect of the model we will alter is the preferences of the candidates. They will now care about both personal consumption (out of the campaign contributions) and winning the elections. The candidates will get to decide how much to consume out of their campaign fund:
where S i is the amount the candidate i actually spends on campaign, C is the amount contributed to the candidate by the lobbies, S −i is campaign spending (net of consumption) of the opponent, and W is the value of winning the election. Of course, this is the problem of a candidate in the third stage of the game. In the first stage, the candidates still get to choose their platforms. We will not allow the candidates in stage 1 to commit to restricting their consumption at the later stage.
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The first order condition of the candidate's (ex-post) problem (4.1) is
In order to get a closed form solution, we will consider a particular functional form of the candidates' utility function:
This assumption dramatically simplifies the analysis, as it implies that, from the perspective of the contributors, the candidates' behavior resembles that in the illustrative example above, and the equilibrium in the second stage is still characterized by equation (3.11).
The first order conditions (4.2) for the campaign spending become:
That is, the candidates spend the same fraction γ of their contributions on their campaigns (and consume the rest)! The fraction γ spent on the campaigns solves
Now, the problem in stage 2 of the (extreme) contributor to candidate i is the familiar max
and the intuition developed in Section 4.2 applies. It is worth noting that the level of contributions does affect the fraction γ spent on the campaign. While the contributors do recognize this fact, their behavior is still captured by the familiar equation (3.11), since their are not concerned with the campaign spending per se, but only with the relative campaign spending of their preferred candidate (relative to the opponent's).
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More formally, the marginal effect of the contributions on the probability of winning the election (taking the effect on candidates' behavior into account) is
which is exactly what we had in section 3.2. This allows us to arrive at the following: 
Generalizations
While the nice closed form results of the last section were derived under a specific functional form assumptions, they do carry over to more general environments.
Consider an environment with the general specification of the candidates' preferences given by equation (2.4). To keep the analysis tractable, we will not let the candidates choose how much to consume -the fraction of contributions spent on campaigning, γ, is given exogenously, as in section 4.2. This is still a meaningful model, since the sophisticated preferences of the candidates affect their platform choices. Proof. Recall from the analysis in section 3 that candidate's choice of platform affects the willingness to contribute of her own and opponent's lobbies symmetrically. Thus, there is no cost to polarization, while there is still the benefit of raising the amount contributed (both to ownself a to the opponent).
This result is especially striking, since the basic mechanism determining the contributions is exactly that of Baron (1994) .
Implications
Corruption need not lead to polarization. If corruption makes the value of being in office higher, it lower the relative weight candidates put on consuming the contributions, and limits the extent of polarization.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that political polarization in the form of campaign contributions from extreme lobby groups arises naturally in models of policy formation, lobbying and electoral success, as a result of the public good characteristic of campaign contributions. Somewhat surprisingly, we also show that under standard assumptions lobbyist divergence is consistent with complete policy convergence, albeit to a midpoint or average lobby group rather than a median voter, as candidates seek to maximize the relative, and not absolute, level of their campaign contributions. Policy divergence then re-emerges once candidates have an incentive to maximize the absolute level of their contributions, either because of "ego rents" or because they are able to divert some contributions for private consumption.
Our most basic models of electoral competition predict that candidate policies should converge. Yet in practice, we observe a great deal of polarization in both candidate policies, and in the identity of the lobby groups who support them. In this paper we have shown that polarization in the form of campaign contributions from extreme lobby groups arises naturally in models of policy formation, lobbying and electoral success, as a result of the public good characteristic of campaign contributions. In contrast to a widely held intuition, we also show that under standard assumptions lobbyist divergence is consistent with complete policy convergence, albeit to a midpoint or average lobby group rather than a median voter, as candidates seek to maximize the relative, and not absolute, level of their campaign contributions. However, we go on to show that a small modification of our standard models that allows candidates to value the absolute level of their contributions in addition to their probability of election, either because of "ego rents" or because they are able to divert some contributions for private consumption, restores the incentive for policy divergence.
The amount of policy polarization observed in practice will depend on the relative strength of the motive for maximizing relative contributions (to maximize electoral success) versus the strength of the motive for maximizing absolute contributions. Differences in these incentives produced by, for example, differences in political institutions across countries, or by differences in the rules and technologies that govern campaign spending over time, may explain different outcomes in practice. However, the predictions of the model can be quite subtle. For example, if countries differ in their level of corruption, the result is likely to depend upon the form corruption takes: when corruption increases the value of an election victory relative to the value of diverting campaign funds, candidate policies might be expected to converge and the absolute level of contributions might fall; if alternatively corruption increases the value candidates place on the absolute level of their campaign contributions, we might expect both the level of contributions and the level of polarization to increase.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is structured along the lines of backwards induction: First, we establish that both candidates will invest strictly positive amounts into their campaigns in all equilibria of every subgame where they have received positive contributions. Second, we establish that the (extreme) lobbies contribute strictly positive amounts to the candidates whenever the candidates' agendas are not identical. Lastly, we obtain the result that the candidates will choose different agendas in any pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose not. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium of some such subgame where one of the candidates consumes all contributions and does not campaign. But then contributions of the other candidate cannot be strictly positive -cutting campaign spending in half would increase consumption without changing the probability of winning the election (by assumption (2.6)).
However, 0 campaign spending by both candidates is not an equilibrium of the subgame either, as investing infinitesimal amount would generate discontinuously larger probability of winning the election (by assumption (2.8)).
Lemma 7 Contributions to both candidates are strictly positive in every equilibrium of every subgame where the candidates' agendas are distinct.
Strictly speaking, the subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist as the subgame in which only one of the candidates receives a positive contribution has no equilibrium (this is simply a matter non-existence of the smallest real number greater than 0). However, there is only one sensible outcome of such a subgame -the candidate with the positive contribution wins the election with probability p(1, 0, ·, ·) and consumes (almost) all of the contribution. Thus, the equilibrium we characterize could be called an almost subgame perfect equilibrium.
Having said that, it should be clear that there is no global equilibrium where only one of the lobbies makes a positive contribution, as that lobby could achieve the same election result with a smaller contribution. As before, 0 contributions to both candidates is not an equilibrium either, as the smallest contribution would discontinuously increase the probability of the preferred candidate being elected.
In what follows, I believe we need some further assumptions: First, for the clarity of the presentation, we might as well assume that Second, I believe that we need to assume (continuous) differentiability of p on the interior. Lastly, as we've discussed, we may need to narrow this down to v(c) = ln(c).
Lastly, we establish that the candidates' agendas are not identical in equilibrium. Suppose not. Suppose that there is an equilibrium where a 1 = a 2 = a * . In that case, contributions are 0, as all lobbies are completely indifferent between the two candidates. Consider an infinitesimal deviation by agent 1: a 1 = a * − . As we have already established, such deviation will generate strictly positive contributions. As we have established in Section 4.3, the candidates will spend the same fraction of their contributions on campaigning, and that implies that the relative contributions are given by equation (3.11).
We have two possible cases to consider. First, suppose that the probability of winning the election changes continuously. This would be the case if a * = j m = j+j 2 , since this would result in ∆ j ∆ j ≈ 1. In this case, there will be an small enough that the gain in utility from consumption will outweigh the possible loss in the probability of winning the election (by assumptions (2.5) and (A.1)). Thus, a * was not an equilibrium.
In principal, we could have a situation where the probability of winning moves discontinuously in favor of one of the candidates. That would happen if a * = j m . But such a * could not be an equilibrium, as one of the candidates would have a strict incentive to deviate from a * . This would be the candidate who would receive greater contributions -if a * > j m , the deviator would be the left candidate (1), while in the opposite case, the right candidate would benefit by deviating (toward the mid point j m ).
It is worth noting that the above argument does not go through when there are informed voters (who are unaffected by the campaign spending) voting deterministically.
8
. In that environment, moving away from the median-voter position lowers the probability of winning the election discontinuously.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
To establish that polarization increases with greed (decreases with W ) when α > 1, take (interior) equilibrium (a * 1 , a * 2 ) which occurs when W = W * . Now consider W * . Or rather, consider W 1 > W * 1 . . . The complete polarization result when α 1 follows directly from the Theorem 2.
